These treaties and agreements are supported by national measures designed to
prevent the advanced weapons-related technologies, materials, and know-how from
falling into the hands of potential proliferators. Export controls in particular
are an essential element of our approach to nonproliferation. Here too,
technical support-in understanding what technologies must be controlled, and
how-is indispensable. Fundamentally, the spread of scientific and technical
know-how is the crux of the supply side of the proliferation problem.
Technological advances on which modern society depends also make it easier to
design, manufacture, and use advanced weapons. Our firm goal is to draw a
balance that will allow countries around the world to reap the economic
benefits of these advances, without compromising national security.
Our domestic export control system addresses the full range of
weapons-related exports, from weapons of mass destruction to dual-use equipment
and technology. The Department of State, pursuant to the provisions of the Arms
Export Control Act, regulates the export of munitions items including weapon
systems, missiles, specially designed components for those systems, and related
technology. The Department of Commerce regulates the export of dual-use items
under the Export Administration Act. Nuclear-related exports are controlled by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, and the Department
of Commerce pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act and in coordination with the
Departments of State and Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
The United States is a member of all the non-proliferation-related
multilateral export control regimes: the Missile Technology Control Regime, for
missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; the Australia Group,
for chemical and biological weapons related materials; the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, for nuclear and
dual-use equipment and materials and related technologies; and the Zangger
Committee, also for nuclear supplies. Each of these regimes coordinates the
controls of member states on the export of equipment, material, and technology
that has a particular utility in the development of weapons of mass destruction
and delivery systems.
The United States has also proposed that a new regime be established to
succeed the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM),
focusing on conventional arms sales and dual-use technologies. Our goals for
this regime are to increase transparency of transfers of conventional arms and
related technology, to establish effective international controls, and to
promote restraint-particularly to regions of tension and to states that are
likely to pose a threat to international peace and security.
Potential proliferators unable to buy technologies in one country are likely
to turn to another, so the international export control system is only as strong
as its weakest links. Therefore, the United States has taken the lead in
assisting other countries in developing their own export controls on
weapons-related technology and materials. Around the globe, the United States
has conducted international seminars on export control, provided equipment, and
helped set up legal infrastructures to implement effective national export
control systems.
Each nation that possesses advanced weapons and weapons-related
technologies, materials, and know-how bears the responsibility for ensuring that
these items do not fall into the wrong hands through theft or diversion. The
global black market in conventional arms, ever-increasing reports of smuggling
of deadly nuclear materials, and the unauthorized leakage of chemical and
biological technologies pose serious threats to international security that must
be addressed.
Within the United States, programs to ensure against theft and diversion of
such items are extensive and highly effective. As just one example, the
Department of Energy spends some $800 million every year on safeguards and
security in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.
In addition, the Administration supports a wide range of cooperative
programs to combat these threats around the world. In particular, the United
States is a leader in cooperative efforts to stop nuclear smuggling and to
ensure that all stocks of fissile materials worldwide are held under the highest
standards of safety, security, and international accountability. Some of the
initiatives we have undertaken include converting research reactors to run on
non-weapons-usable low-enriched uranium and taking back spent U.S.-origin HEU
fuel for safe storage in the United States. We are working actively with other
countries to end the accumulation of excess stocks of plutonium and HEU, and,
over time, to reduce these stocks.
Technologies for detection, monitoring, and verification are the centerpiece
of the U.S. nonproliferation and arms control S&T program. From satellites
that can snap pictures of a new weapons facility under construction, to airborne
sensors that can "sniff" the effluent from a chemical weapons
production plant, to ships that can track missiles as they streak across the
sky, the United States has developed and deployed a wide-ranging global network
of national technical means of verification that can support arms
reduction and nonproliferation monitoring. National technical
means of verification are the cornerstone of our national monitoring capability
and provide a vital underpinning for cooperative measures as well, offering
critical clues to focus inspection efforts. In addition, the United
States is a world leader in
developing new technologies and approaches for cost-effective on-site
inspections-a critical part of most international regimes.
All these programs rely heavily on advanced science and technology.
Technological advancements are the key to better and cheaper detection and
monitoring, which, in turn, can facilitate new agreements to enhance national
security.
Our science and technology program in detection and monitoring is extremely
broad, encompassing sensors for virtually every part of the electromagnetic
spectrum as well as detectors of other indicators of weapons-related activities.
Most activities are directed at establishing technological feasibility, although
some develop operational capabilities. These systems are designed to operate on
a variety of platforms, under conditions ranging from cooperative to
noncooperative. They depend on sophisticated control, communications, data
processing, and analysis methods. Much of the R&D in this area is conducted
at Federally funded laboratories, including those of the Departments of Energy
and Defense, and by commercial firms under contract to the U.S. Government. To
maintain the ability of these laboratories to respond to specific requirements
that emerge, often with little lead time, a continuing broad-based program of
basic science in fields as diverse as biology, chemistry, optics, and
solid-state physics is essential.
Detection technologies can be placed into three broad categories:
space-based, land-sea-air-based, and on-site.
Satellites are used for a vast array of monitoring tasks, from
photoreconnaissance to detection of atmospheric nuclear tests. We are conducting
a wide-ranging program of research and development on new monitoring
technologies, which includes the design and fabrication for actual deployment of
sensor systems needed for treaty verification and proliferation detection. The
technology of satellite detection is expensive and exacting, but it must be
supported if our monitoring capabilities are to keep pace with a fast-changing
world.
As one critical example, we are expanding our research and development
efforts to detect nuclear proliferant activities before the assembly of weapons.
New space-based sensor systems may offer the capability to identify some of the
signatures associated with the early stages of nuclear weapons development
programs-such as waste heat from a hidden nuclear reactor.
Ground stations around the world are used to track potentially
threatening activities, with radar, radio, and other sensors. Aircraft
can take photographs, listen to radio signals, and pick up air samples
for chemical analysis. Ships at sea are particularly useful for
monitoring missile tests and naval and coastal activities.
In all these areas, too, our ongoing S&T program is opening new
opportunities for arms control and nonproliferation. For example, we have
established research and development programs to develop the capability
to remotely detect trace gases associated with proliferant activities
through active or passive sensing techniques, to analyze extremely small
samples and detect small concentrations of key chemical signatures, and
to extract critical information from huge amounts of data from multiple
sources. These technologies will be key to our ability to detect,
characterize, and locate proliferation activities.
